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ABSTRACT 
Around the world, airports are being viewed as enterprises, rather than public 
services, which are expected to be managed efficiently and provide passengers with 
courteous customer services. Governments are, increasingly, turning to the private 
sectors for their efficiency in managing the operation, financing, and development, 
as well as providing security for airports. Operational and financial performance 
evaluation has become increasingly important to airport operators due to recent 
trends in airport privatization. Assessing performance allows the airport operators 
to plan for human resources and capital investment as efficiently as possible. 
Productivity measurements may be used as comparisons and guidelines in strategic 
planning, in the internal analysis of operational efficiency and effectiveness, and in 
assessing the competitive position of an airport in transportation industry. The 
primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the operational and financial 
efficiencies of 22 major airports in the United States and Europe. These airports are 
divided into three groups based on private ownership (7 British Airport Authority 
airports), public ownership (8 major United States airports), and a mix of private 
and public ownership (7 major European Union airports. The detail ownership 
structures of these airports are presented in Appendix A). Total factor productivity 
(TFP) model was utilized to measure airport performance in terms of financial and 
operational efficiencies and to develop a benchmarking tool to identify the areas of 
strength and weakness. A regression model was then employed to measure the 
relationship between TFP and ownership structure. Finally a Granger causality test 
was performed to determine whether ownership structure is a Granger cause of 
TFP. The results of the analysis presented in this paper demonstrate that there is not 
a significant relationship between airport TFP and ownership structure. Airport 
productivity and efficiency is, however, dependent upon the level of competition, 
choice of the market, and regulatory control. 
Bijan Vasigh is professor of Economics and Finance in the College of Business at Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach Florida and a Managing Director at Aviation 
Consulting Group, LLC. Dr. Vasigh received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from the State 
University of New York in 1984, and he has written and published many articles concerning the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Airport privatization was pioneered by Great Britain under the Thatcher 
Government as a result of its initial public offering of 100 percent of the 
shares in the former British Airports Authority (BAA) in 1987. Thus the 
prevailing model for airport privatization in Europe is outright sale as 
initiated by the British Government with its sale of BAA. BAA is now the 
largest airport operator in the world, with ownership of 7 airports in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and management of 11 airports outside of the UK, 
serving more than 230 million passengers a year (BAA, 2006).1 Global 
airport privatization continues to be the predominant trend worldwide. 
Governments around the world are turning to private enterprises for airport 
management and development. More than 100 large and medium-size 
airports are being privatized in Europe, Asia, Australia, Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and North America. 
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1 On June 6, 2006, Spanish construction consortium, Grupo Ferrovial officially 
acquired the entire capital of the BAA for $19.30 billion. The Company manages 
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Proponents of airport privatization believe the benefits of airport 
privatization include increases in operating efficiency through the transfer of 
ownership and management of public assets to private sectors, improvement 
of airport amenities, and increases in financial efficiencies in the form of 
increased revenues, increased profits, and reduced risks in undertaking 
unprofitable projects. Those who benefit from private management of 
airports are passengers, commercial airlines, private owners of airplanes, 
state and local government units through new revenue streams, and 
taxpayers. 
Airport privatization can occur in many ways, including contract 
management, long-term lease, and sale. There are different objectives 
associated with each method of privatization. Contract management is often 
used for existing airports that are losing money, and the objective of contract 
management is usually to reduce costs and increase revenues to eliminate the 
deficit and potentially create a profitable airport operation. Long-term leases 
are often used for existing airports where a significant airport development is 
anticipated. The objective of a long-term lease is to shift a significant portion 
of the risk of new development from taxpayers to a private lessee. The term 
of the lease is primarily related to the length of time needed by the private 
lessee to recover its investment in new development and potentially make 
some profit. 
The sale of an airport to the private sector is the most common method 
of global airport privatization. In full divestiture, the government generally 
sells entire airports as part of an overall program of divesting itself of a non-
core business. This was the motivation for the British government in the 
1987 sale of BAA. In some cases, governments only sell a majority or 
minority portion of the ownership and maintain the rest of the business 
interest for direct influence in airport management or for using the sale 
proceeds to finance airport expansion. 
In an attempt to address the relative productivity and efficiency of 
commercial airports, both private and public, the authors utilize Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) to develop a benchmarking tool to identify the areas of 
strength and weakness. The results shall enable airport managers to assess 
their competitive positions through operational and service comparisons. 
AIRPORT OWNERSHIP, PRIVATIZATION, AND PERFORMANCE 
ANALYSIS 
Airports are the backbone of the worldwide commercial transportation 
system. Air transportation of passengers and cargo is a dominant element of 
the transportation industry. Increasing passenger demand, escalating cargo 
expansion, increasing operating costs, and liability exposure have placed 
tremendous capital demands on government and state airport owners. As a 
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result, governments recognize that private investment capital is needed to 
meet airport expansion and commercialized management is needed to meet 
airports' operating efficiency and customer services, and therefore 
governments began to look into airport privatization. 
While the trend of airport privatization is heating up around the world, 
in the United States (US) the airport privatization process is marching at a 
slower pace. Proponents argue that privatization would inject much needed 
capital into the aviation infrastructure. Opponents claim that local 
governments favor privatization as a way to divert airport revenue intended 
for developing aviation infrastructure to other municipal purposes, resulting 
in higher costs for airlines and passengers. 
The privatization of the Stewart Airport in Newburgh, New York, is the 
very first airport privatization in the US under the 1996 Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) five-airport pilot program. Stewart Airport was 
leased for 99 years to National Express, a British company, in 2000. In five 
years, the airport managed to increase its passenger count by 33 percent and 
to attract new tenants who provided aviation services. The application for 
privatization of the New Orleans Lakefront Airport for a long-term lease to 
American Airport Corporation was submitted to the FAA in 2002 and as of 
June 27, 2005, the application required additional information for FAA final 
review (Bennett, 2005). In 2005, a new application was submitted to the 
FAA for approval of construction of a new airport, Abraham Lincoln 
National Airport, in Peotone about 40 miles south of downtown Chicago. 
The South Suburban Airport Commission held a competition and selected a 
team led by LVOR and SNC-Lavalin to finance, build, and operate the 
airport as a public-private partnership in which the government owns the 
land and the private contractor owns and operates the facilities (Sander 
2004). 
Other examples of successful airport privatization efforts in the US 
include the management contract awarded to BAA by the Indianapolis 
Airport Authority. In October of 1995, the BAA took over the management 
of Indianapolis International Airport promising to raise non-airline revenues 
by $32 million within the 10-year period of the contract. The contract was 
renegotiated in 1998 and extended until2008. Between 1995 and 1999, costs 
per passenger were reduced from $6.70 to $3.70 and have increased very 
little since then. In spite of a moderate passenger annual growth rate of 3.5 
percent, non-airline revenue per passenger more than doubled by 2003 
(Vasigh & Haririan, 2003). 
While over 100 airports around the world are either privatized or are in 
the process of being transferred to private enterprises, there are few studies 
that have been conducted to address the relative productivity of private 
versus public airports in terms of operational and financial efficiencies. With 
the privatization wave on the horizon, one surmises that privately owned 
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airports should outperform public airports in terms of TFP. However the 
latest research on this subject by Vasigh and Haririan (2003) could not 
document superiority of private airports over public airports. This study used 
8 US airports as the only public airports and 7 British airports owned by 
BAA as the only private airports. Vasigh and Haririan observed that 
countries having privatized airports generally impose some form of price 
regulation or landing fees. In the UK, for example, landing fees are market-
based pricing, indicating that landing fees are higher for peak travel times, 
and therefore private airports showed higher revenues from landing fees. 
They also concluded that privatization advocates point to labor productivity 
growth at airports in the UK as evidence of efficiency in private airports. 
The results of other studies by Oum, Yu, and Fu (2003) and Oum, 
Zhang, and Zhang (2004) indicate that the airports owned by mixed 
enterprises with a private sector majority ownership are more efficient than 
airports owned by government branches or 100% public corporation. 
Performance can be assessed based on financial efficiency or 
operational efficiency. Efficiency has several dimensions, two of which are 
economic efficiency and technological efficiency: economic efficiency 
means that the firm is using resources in such combinations that the cost per 
unit of output for that rate of output is the least; technological efficiency 
means that it must not be possible to produce the same rate of output with 
lesser amount of any resource. 
In the airport industry, creation of a set of uniform performance 
measures has been essential not only to airport management but to airlines as 
well. Apart from measures of an airport's economic efficiency, managers 
need to be able to assess the input/output relationship in considering 
alternative investments or future developments. 
The authors used 3 groups of airports consisting of 8 US public airports, 
7 BAA private airports, and 7 European Union (EU) airports, both private 
and public? They utilized financial and operational data such as landing fees, 
total assets, aircraft movements, number of airport gates, the annual number 
of enplaned passengers, and runway capacity. Initially, the authors adopted 
TFP to analyze the efficiency and performance measures of airports within 
each group by comparing and cross-referencing them with each other. They 
assessed and evaluated the performance of commercial airport(s) by 
developing a benchmarking tool to identify the areas of strength and 
weakness. This analysis led to identifying those airports that are not efficient 
and are thus dominated by other efficient airports. 
2 These airports represent different sizes and ownership structure and 
located across EU and US. Availability of data was a major factor in our 
selection. 
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There are specific applications of this study. The report will allow the 
airport manager to: 
1. Improve airport organizational quality; 
2. Lower cost position; 
3. Expose airport employees to new ideas; 
4. Broaden the airport organization's operating perspective; 
5. Create a culture open to new ideas; and 
6. Raise the airport's level of maximum potential performance. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The airport data reflected in this research are for five years from 2000 
through 2004 and include a total of 22 airports in the following three groups: 
1. US commercial airports (8 public airports), 
2. BAA, (7 private airports), and 
3. EU (the 7 busiest airports, both private and public). 
The selected airports are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Airports Selected for tbe Total Factor Productivity Analysis 
BAA Airports3 (Group 1) 
Aberdeen (ABZ) 
Edinburgh (EDD 
Glasgow (GLA) 
London Gatwick (LGW) 
London Heathrow (LHR) 
London Stansted (STN) 
Southampton (SOU) 
US Airports4 (Group 2) 
Atlanta (ATL) 
Chicago (ORD) 
Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) 
Denver (DEN) 
Detroit (DTW) 
Los Angeles (LAX) 
Newark (EWR) 
San Francisco (SFO) 
EU Airports5 (Group 3) 
Amsterdam (AMS) 
Frankfurt (FRA) 
Munich (MUC) 
Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 
Paris Orly (ORY) 
Rome Fiumicino (FCO) 
Zurich (ZRH) 
The authors selected 3 input factors and 5 output measures that are 
relevant in assessing airport productivity. Of the three input factors selected 
in this paper, two are financial and one is non-financial. The financial input 
factors are operation cost and net total assets. For European and British 
airports, operation cost was measured as total revenue minus earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT). Appendix A shows ownership structure of non-UK 
3 BAA owns and operates seven major airport facilities in England as well as 
other countries. 
4 The financial data for both input and output factors were obtained from the 
FAA and AirNav.com for all US airports. 
5 The financial data for both input and output factors were obtained from the 
respective annual reports for the non-US airports. 
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European airports. The non-financial factor, runway area, was measured as 
the sum of all active runways' area (length x width) given in square meters. 
Of the 5 output measures selected, 2 are financial and 3 are non-
financial. The financial output measures are operational and non-operational 
revenues. Researchers must distinguish between operational and non-
operational revenues, because an airport's primary purpose is getting 
passengers airborne, but many airports still earn a majority of their revenue 
on land-side operations, in areas ranging from parking and concession to 
direct retail. The non-financial measures are total terminal passengers, total 
airport movements, and aircraft landing fees. Total terminal passengers, 
measured on an annual basis, is indicative of an airport's ability to create 
demand and serve customers. Total airport movements measure the output 
of airside operations. 
Input and output data are based on the total annual number of operations 
including air carriers, general aviation, air taxis, and military. These data are 
common among all the airports and contain financial and operational figures. 
Methodology 
A constant challenge in measuring productivity is deciding on precisely 
which measures to use. While not unique to airports, this problem requires 
using measures which can be applied to most airports and measures which 
can be obtained for airports under study. The primary objective of this study 
is to investigate the relationship between airport productivity and ownership 
and management structure. 
There are a number of techniques that have been adopted and applied to 
measure airport efficiencies including ratio analysis, regression analysis, data 
envelopment analysis (Gillen & Lall, 1997), and TFP (Harrigan, 1997; 
Hooper & Hensher, 1997). This research utilizes TFP as it is proven to be the 
most accurate measure of productivity of all inputs involved in the 
production process, which allows for measuring cost efficiency and 
effectiveness and for distinguishing productivity differences in airport 
performance that arise from economies of scales and from managerial 
performance (Oum, Yu, and Fu, 2003; Oum, Zhang, and Zhang, 2004; 
Vasigh & Harnzaee, 1998; Vasigh & Harririan, 2003). This technique can 
also be used for investigating the impact of variations of input and output 
prices on an airport's performance (Gillen & Lall, 1997). 
The following TFP index (model) was employed in this research which 
is similar to the framework introduced by Caves et al. (1982), which is also 
reviewed and analyzed by Hooper and Hensher (1997): 
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ln(TFPkJ= L(Rki +RJlnYki -lnYi)- L(Rbi +RJlnYbi -lnYi) 
TFPb 
-L (w kn + W n Xln X kn -In X n )+ L (wbn + W n Xln X bn -In X n) 
where: 
k =each individual observation, k = 1, ... , K 
b =base observation (a particular or average observation) 
i =outputs, i = 1, ... ,/ 
n =inputs,n = l, ... ,N 
Ri = weights for each output 
Ri =arithmetic mean of output weights over all airports 
wn = weights for each input 
W n = arithmetic mean of input weights over all airports 
In~ = unit measure of output 
In Y i =geometric mean of unit measure over all airports 
lnX n =unit measure of input 
In Xi = geometric mean of unit measure over all airports 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Total factor productivity model 
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Based on TFP values as presented in Table 2 for the BAA group (private 
ownership structure), London Heathrow achieved the highest score 
throughout all 5 years under study. In the US group (public ownership 
structure), the highest score for 2004 is observed for Chicago O'Hare 
Airport, followed by Newark Airport for 2001 through 2003, and Atlanta 
Airport for 2000. In the third group (mixed private and public ownership), 
consisting of EU airports excluding the UK, Frankfurt has the highest scores 
for the years 2000 and 2001 and Paris Charles de Gaulle for the years 2002 
and 2003; the airports share the highest score in 2004. 
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Table 2. Total Factor Productivity Scores for Selected Airports, 2000-2004 
Year 
Airport 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Europe (excluding UK) 
Amsterdam 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.97 
Frankfurt 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.04 1.06 
Munich 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 
Paris Charles de 
* 1.05 1.05 1.07 1.06 Gaulle 
Paris Orly * 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Rome Fiurnicino 1.01 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94 
Zurich 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 
United Kingdom (BAA) 
Aberdeen 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Edinburgh 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Glasgow 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
London Gatwick 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 
London Heathrow 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.17 1.11 
London Stansted 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 
Southampton 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.09 
United States 
Atlanta 1.13 1.11 1.05 1.04 1.07 
Chicago O'Hare 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Dallas-Forth Worth 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 
Denver 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 
Detroit 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Los Angeles 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.04 1.05 
Newark 1.12 1.11 1.15 1.16 1.09 
San Francisco 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Note. For the year of 2000 no data could be obtained for Paris Charles de Gaulle and Paris Orly. 
Based on average annual TFP for airport groups as presented in Table 3, 
the US airports group, representing public ownership structure, had the 
highest average annual TFP throughout the 5 years and outperformed the 
BAA airports group, representing private ownership structure, and the EU 
airports group, representing a mixture of private and public ownership 
structure. 
Table 3. Average annual Total Factor Productivity for Airport Groups, 2000-2004 
Year 
Airport 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Europe (excluding UK) 1.004 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.990 
United Kingdom (BAA) 1.034 1.034 1.034 1.030 1.023 
United States 1.046 1.046 1.044 1.044 1.043 
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Table 4 exhibits the 5-year average TFP for the third group (EU 
airports). Based on a 5- year average TFP, Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport 
scored the highest followed by Frankfort, Amsterdam, Paris Orly, Zurich, 
Munich, and Rome. 
Table 4. Five-year Average Total Factor Productivity for European Union Airports 
Group, 2000-2004 
Ownership Average TFP for 
EU Airport Structure 2000-2004 
Amsterdam Private Management 0.991 
Frankfurt Private Management 1.056 
Munich Public 0.958 
Paris Charles de Public 1.058 Gaulle 
Paris Orly Public 0.978 
Rome Fiurnicino 97% Private 0.948 
Zurich 51% Public 0.960 
Table 5 presents the ranking of all 22 airports based on a 5-year average 
TFP score. The leading airport is London Heathrow from the first Group 
(airports with a private ownership structure) with a score of 1.18, followed 
by Newark (1.126) and Chicago O'Hare (1.093) from the second group 
(airports with a public ownership structure). 
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Table 5. Airport Ranking Based on Five-year Average Total Factor Productivity Scores, 
2000-2004 
Rank Airport Region Score 
London Heathrow UK 1.180 
2 Newark us 1.126 
3 Chicago O'Hare us 1.093 
4 Southampton UK 1.084 
5 Atlanta us 1.080 
6 London Gatwick UK 1.059 
7 Paris Charles de Gaulle EU 1.058 
8 Frankfurt EU 1.056 
9 Los Angeles us 1.050 
10 Dallas-Forth Worth us 1.024 
11 Detroit us 1.002 
12 San Francisco us 0.997 
13 Amsterdam EU 0.991 
14 Denver us 0.985 
15 Aberdeen UK 0.984 
16 Glasgow UK 0.979 
17 Paris Or1y EU 0.978 
18 Edinburgh UK 0.976 
19 London Stansted UK 0.962 
20 Zurich EU 0.960 
21 Munich EU 0.958 
22 Rome Fiumicino EU 0.948 
Figures 1 through 3 compare TFP within all three groups for a period of 
five years from 2000 through 2004. In Figure 1, EU airports group, Paris 
Charles de Gaulle and Frankfort airports outperform the other airports. In 
Figure 2, UK airports group, London Heathrow outperforms the other airport 
listed over the five-year period. In Figure 3, US airports group, overall 
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Newark outperforms other airports listed although Chicago O'Hare extended 
its performance ahead of Newark in 2004. 
Figure 1. Total Factor Productivity for European Union Airports, 2000-2004 
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Figure 3. Total Factor Productivity for United States Airports, 2000-2004 
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Figure 4 compares the annual average TFP for all three groups over five 
years (2000 - 2004 ). US airports consistently score higher than UK airports 
(BAA group), and EU airports always score lower than UK airports. 
Figure 4. Total Factor Productivity for Selected Airports Grouped by Geographical 
Region, 2000-2004 
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Stepwise-regression model 
In order to evaluate and analyze the relationship between airport 
productivity and others factors such as airport ownership structure, 
management policy, and financial condition, the authors have developed the 
following functional relationship:6 
TFP=f(RW, OC, NA, TP, MV, LF, OR, NR, D1, D2, D3, D4) 
where: 
RW = Airport runway area 
OC = Airport operation cost 
NA = Net total asset 
MV = Aircraft movements 
LF = Aircraft landing fee 
OR = Operating revenue 
NR =Non-operating revenue 
D1 = Dummy variable, ownership structure 
D1 = 1 100% private 
D1 = 0 not 100% private 
D2 = Dummy variable, airport location 
D2 = 1, all US airports 
D2 = 0, non-US airports 
D3 = Dummy variable, multiple private entity 
D3 =1, multiple-airport operator 
D3 =0, single-airport operator 
D4 = Dummy variable, multiple public entity 
D4 =1, multiple public entities owner or management 
D4 =0, single public entity owner 
Stepwise-regression analysis was used to reveal whether productivity, 
defined as TFP, was related to runway size, airport operating cost, airport net 
assets, airport movements, landing fee, airport management, or ownership 
structure. This functional relationship was chosen because it selects the 
independent variable that is most predictive of the dependent variable (i.e., 
highest correlation with dependent variable "airport productivity") as 
indicated by the significance oft values. 
6 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) test was conducted among aircraft movements and 
operational revenue to uncover the possibility of multicollinearity. Since the calculated 
VIF value (6) was less than 10, therefore we reject multicollinearity between these two 
variables. This is a simple rule of thumb, since the VlF (like R2) is a statistic without a 
distribution. 
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As Table 6 presents, the estimated coefficients for landing fees, runway 
area, aircraft movements, operational revenue, net assets, and dummy 
variable 3 (private multiple-airport multiple operator) are significant with at 
least 95 percent confidence. This result indicates that these independent 
variables contribute significantly to the TFP of the airport. On the other 
hand, the t-value for dummy variables 1, 2, and 4 are statistically 
insignificant, indicating that ownership structure, airport location (in group 
1, 2, or 3), and public multiple entity are not contributors to airport 
productivity. As the results show, airport productivity was positively 
affected by landing fee, aircraft movements, and operational revenues and 
negatively affected by runway area and net assets. It also indicates that 
airports with higher TFP ratings may have used runways more intensively 
and used net assets more efficiently. In addition, the significance of dummy 
variable 3 indicates that if an airport operator manages more than one airport 
it will enjoy economies of scale in several areas, such as finance and 
marketing. Therefore, overall productivity increases and has a positive 
impact on the TFP score. 
Table 6. Summary of Stepwise Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting the Total 
Factor Productive Score (N = 108) 
Log-Linear Linear function 
Variable B SEB B B SEB II 
Constant 
Landing Fee 
Runway 
Area (m2) 
Aircraft 
Movements 
Dummy3 
(multiple airports) 
Operational Revenues 
Net Assets 
0.326 0.086 0.892 
(3.813) (93.086) 
0.052 0.005 0.550 0.015 
(9.680) (18.198) 
-0.096 0.010 -1.203 -0.000 
(-9.932) (-10.466) 
0.137 0.010 1.630 0.000 
(13.170) (17.810) 
0.037 0.010 0.289 0.015 
(3.592) (2.322) 
0.027 0.006 0.464 0.000 
(4.336) (6.841) 
-0.019 0.006 -0.320 -0.000 
(-3.214) (-0.146) 
0.010 
0.001 0.670 
0.000 -0.570 
0.000 1.012 
0.007 0.123 
0.000 0.335 
0.000 -0.007 
Note. Log Values: Adjusted R2 = .733; Durbin-Watson autocorrelation= 2.308. Non-Log 
Values: Adjusted R2 = .874; Durbin-Watson autocorrelation= 2.020. Values in parentheses are 
t-values. 
Granger causality test 
The authors furthermore applied the Granger (1969) causality test 
between TFP and airport ownership, runway area, airport movement and 
operating revenue. The results of Granger causality tests are reported in 
Table 7. Generally, there is some evidence that TFP and runway area have 
Granger causality to each other. 
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Table 7. Granger Causality Test, for Airport Groups, 2000-2004 
US Airports BAA Airports EU Airports Aggregate 
No. FPE No. FPE No. FPE No. FPE 
Lags Lags Lags Lags 
RW ->TFP 2 0.00564 3 0.01023 3 0.10320 2 0.10747 
MV ->TFP 3 0.00164 2 0.08322 0.12032 2 0.00591 
NA->TFP 0.10747 0.09210 2 0.07912 2 0.00792 
OR->TFP 2 0.01201 2 0.00003 2 0.06070 2 0.00000 
-> Denotes Granger Causality 
FPE is Final Prediction Error 
In this section, the authors examined the causal relationship between 
airport landing fees, runway area, operating revenue, net assets, operating 
costs and airport total productivity. The relationship between airport 
operating cost and airport productivity is complex and the historical 
evidences are not clear. A large cut in airports operating expenses may 
reduce productivity because of diminishing returns due to more intensive use 
of variable resources; this is likely because large-scale and across-the-board 
cost cutting results in cutting productive and unproductive resources. Thus, 
it would seem that past values of airport operating costs may not help to 
predict TFP. 
Furthermore, the Granger causality test indicated that there is no long-
run relationship between the airport productivity and airport landing fees, 
operating revenue, and operating costs. However, the results for the BAA 
airports show that the runway area is Granger causes of airport productivity 
(but not for the other airport groups under the study). 
CONCLUSION 
The productivity and efficiency of any airport depends on the market 
power, regulatory control, choice of market to serve, and level of 
competition in the environment that it operates. In this research, the authors 
have assessed the performance of the 22 major international airports and 
utilized TFP model to measure airport performance. 
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This study concludes that airport operators managing more that one 
airport will enjoy a higher level of TFP than those that operate only one 
airport. Operators find this improvement through possible economies of 
scale in several areas that contribute to overall factor productivity of airports. 
This follows the reasoning of basic economics. 
The study further found an inverse relationship between TFP and two of 
the input factors used in this model, total net assets and runway area. The 
negative coefficients imply that airports with higher TFP ratings may have 
used runways more intensively and used net assets more efficiently. It may 
also indicate that one airport operator may be able to produce greater outputs 
with the same net assets and runway area than another operator. 
The positive relationships between TFP and landing fees, aircraft 
movements, and operational revenues, imply that these input factors 
contribute to increasing returns to scale. Therefore, increasing TFP may 
require additional units of these factors. Similarly, the increase in these 
input factors will result in a higher level of productivity. 
The results of the analysis presented in this research paper demonstrate, 
among the airports under the study, that the ownership and management 
structure of an airport does not necessarily contribute to its productivity. 
These results support the prior findings of Vasigh and Harrian (2003), which 
found no link between ownership structure and productivity. 
The quality of managerial performance, on one hand influenced by the 
distinct patterns of authority, responsibility, and economic incentives 
provided by the ownership arrangements and on the other hand depends on 
the market and competition conditions in which the airports operate. The US 
airports, although, marked as public ownership that owned by government 
departments or public authorities, majority of their operations are contracted 
to private enterprises. Since US airports operate in a competitive 
environment with significant private contractors of their operations, it is not 
unexpected to see that their performances are not significantly different as 
compared to the airports owned by the private enterprises under this study. 
Further tests of the link between ownership structure and productivity 
might be most easily seen in time-series test on airports that adjusted their 
ownership structures. As airports worldwide privatize, there will be 
opportunities to measure the value of shifts in ownership structure. This 
could provide important observations in this critical time. With changing 
airports structures, one can compare the resulting change in productivity of 
the same airport with respect to changes in organizational structure, 
organizational direction, and strategic decision making. These comparisons 
may produce the most fruitful results. 
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APPENDIX 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN AIRPORTS 
(EXCL. UK) 
Airport Ownership Structure 
Amsterdam Managed and operated by Schiphol Group: 
75.8% State of Netherlands 
21.8% City of Amsterdam 
2.4% City of Rotterdam 
Frankfurt Managed and operated by Fraport: 
31.7% State of Hesse 
20.3% Stadtwerke Frankfurt am main Holding GmbH 
6.6% Federal Republic of Germany (exchangeable 
bond) 
5.4% Julius Baer Investment Management LLC 
5.0% Deutsche Lufthansa 
31.0% free float 
Munich Managed and operated by Flughafen Muenchen GmbH: 
51.0% Free State of Bavaria 
26.0% Federal Republic of Germany 
23.0% City of Munich 
Paris Charles de Gaulle Managed and operated by Aeroports de Paris S.A., a state-
Paris Orly owned company. 
Rome Fiumicino Managed and operated by Aeroporti di Roma (ADR S.p.A.): 
44.68% Macquarie Airports Group 
51.08% Leonardo S .r.l. 
3.00% Local Authorities (1.33% Regione Lazio, 1.33% 
Comune de Roma, 0.25% Provincia, 0.1% 
Comune de FCO) 
1.24% Others 
Zurich Managed and operated by Unique AG: 
51.00% Public sector 
13.51% Financial Institution 
3.78% Private individuals 
2.78% Companies 
1.10% Pension Funds 
27.83% Free float 
